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HOW RELIABLE ARE THE STATISTICS  
FOR THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT? 
 
 
 “The fundamental objective of the excessive deficit procedure is 
to identify, as quickly as possible, a situation of excessive deficit 
or debt and to put an end to it.” 
ECOFIN Council Conclusions on statistical governance, 
8 November 2005. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental objective of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) – that is, the 
corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – is to identify, and put to an end 
to, situations of excessive deficit, as quickly as possible.1 This aim is reflected in the 
rapidity with which several steps in the procedure take place. Interestingly, the title of the 
applicable regulation is “on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure.”2 Although the 2005 reform of the SGP has extended the 
deadlines for several steps in the procedure, made those deadlines less strict and the 
whole procedure less tight, the whole procedure still takes place at a frantic pace.3 
This haste contrasts with the time frame for compilation and publication of budgetary 
statistics. The first outcomes for a given year are published at the beginning of the 
subsequent year – but these figures are not final; they include partial information or 
estimates that need to be revised at a later stage. Data are revised twice a year for at least 
four years; sometimes more frequently and for longer. 
The difference in the time frames of policy decisions and of availability and revision of 
data means that the first outcomes are those that matter for the procedure and those on 
the basis of which crucial policy decisions are taken. Therefore, the strategic incentives 
linked to numerical rules relate first and foremost to the first data transmissions (see for 
example Buti et al., 2006). The revised data are of better quality than the first outturns 
but are rarely relevant for the procedure, as they appear too late. 
                                                 
1  For the economic foundations of fiscal surveillance in the EU, see Brunila, et al. (eds.) (2001) and 
Buti and Franco (2005) and references therein. 
2  Council Regulation (EC) N° 1467/97 (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p.6). Regulation as amended by Regulation 
(EC) N° 1056/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5). 
3  Data are reported by Member States in spring and autumn each year. Eurostat has three weeks to 
scrutinise, validate and publish the data. If the reference values are exceeded, the Commission 
prepares a report. Within two weeks of the adoption of the report, the Economic and Financial 
Committee formulates an opinion; within four months of the reporting dates, the Council decides 
whether the deficit is excessive and adopts recommendations; the country concerned has six months 
for effective action; immediately after this period, the Council checks whether effective action has 
been taken; if not, it has two months to adopt a notice. A decision to impose financial sanctions can be 
taken four months after the notice and 16 months after data have been reported. For more on the steps 
of the procedure and on the SGP reform, see European Commission (2005, in particular section II.1 
thereof). 
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In a number of instances, decisions would have been different if final data had been 
available earlier.4 The large revisions in the data of a few countries have harmed not only 
those countries’ reputation, but also the credibility of the whole procedure, and have 
raised issues of equity among Member States.  
Are there ways of improving this situation? Clearly, the solution is not to stop the SGP-
related procedures and wait until final data are available. In many cases, when final 
figures are published, the budgetary difficulties that motivated a procedure have already 
been solved or, in a less benign configuration – which would be likely in case if no 
policy action has been taken, the situation has kept deteriorating, and the correction will 
be more painful. 
Over the last years, there have been some measures at the EU level and in specific 
Member States intended to upgrade the quality of the budgetary statistics.5 While the 
very large revisions that took place in a few countries in the past were exceptional and 
will hopefully not be repeated, it must be acknowledged that data revisions are 
inevitable. Although technological progress in information technology speeds up data 
collection, the complexity of the accounting rules and the number of transactions to 
record (millions of transactions by thousands of government units in each country) mean 
that the production of final statistics remains a long and painstaking task. 
One possible way of improving things would be to explicitly acknowledge, in each step 
of the EDP, that the budgetary data are subject to revisions, and that the reliability of data 
increases with time and differs from country to country. Though we are unable to say 
how the first outcome published by a given country will be revised, experience can help 
us infer the uncertainty surrounding the deficit and debt figures reported by Member 
States. This may help in identifying situations of risk of excessive deficit. In some cases, 
it may make sense to postpone the abrogation of a procedure when the deficit ratio has 
fallen below, but remains close to, 3% of GDP, and there is a significant risk that the 
deficit figures will have to be revised to above the reference value at a later stage, in 
particular if some other indicators suggest that an upward revision is likely.6 At least the 
policy-makers should be made aware of, and the relevant acts should explicitly refer to, 
the fact that the data on which crucial decisions are taken are subject to revision.7  
                                                 
4  A few examples: the excessive deficit procedure for Finland was abrogated in June 1997 on the basis 
of a deficit ratio for 1996, reported on 1 March 1997, of 2.6% of GDP; that ratio was then 
successively revised to 3.1%, 3.3% and even 3.5% of GDP. In March 2002, Portugal reported a deficit 
ratio of 2.2% of GDP for 2001; after six months the deficit ratio was revised to 4.1% of GDP; as a 
result, the ensuing procedure started half a year later than should have been the case; in March 2004, 
two years after the first transmission, the deficit ratio was further revised upwards to 4.4% of GDP. In 
Greece, there were several very large revisions in the deficit and debt ratios; the largest revision 
concerned 2001: Greece reported a small government surplus of 0.1% of GDP in March 2002 which 
was then successively revised to deficits of 1.4%, 1.5%, 3.7% and 6.1% of GDP. In spring 2005, the 
Commission initiated a procedure against Italy, as it appeared that the 2004 deficit was at 3.0%; in fact 
the 2004 deficit ratio was revised to 3.4% and it appeared that the 2001 and 2003 ratios were also 
above 3%. 
5  See European Commission (2005, in particular box II.2; and 2006, in particular section II.4.4 thereof). 
6  On the usage of multiple indicators to countercheck the official deficit and debt figures, see Balassone 
et al. (2006a). 
7  Another way to accelerate the compilation of statistics could be to simplify the accounting rules. 
However, this option does not seem to be on the cards and this paper does not dwell on this specific 
issue. Note, nonetheless, that Tanzi (2006) argues that “the concept that the statisticians have chosen 
(the accrual concept), though superior to [a simpler] cash concept in some ways, suffers from the 
shortcoming that it is not easy to calculate and does not provide policy-makers with a gauge of the 
4 
The aim of this paper is to assess the reliability of the government deficit and debt 
figures reported to the European Commission by Member States.8 As far as we know, no 
other paper has attempted to do so in a systematic manner. The paper is organised as 
follows. In the next section, we discuss some conceptual issues about quality in statistics 
and better delimit the scope of the analysis; in particular, we identify reliability as one of 
the several dimensions of quality in statistics. Section 3 details the available data and the 
procedure for calculating the relevant indicators. Sections 4 and 5 compare the reliability 
of figures reported by the different EU Member States. Section 6 compares the revisions 
in deficit and debt figures. Section 7 elaborates on the evolution of reliability over time, 
while section 8 provides a preliminary examination on the relationship between size of 
revisions and size of deficits. Section 9 summarises the main findings and concludes. 
2. QUALITY OF STATISTICS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPT 
The quality of economic statistics is crucial for an adequate understanding of the 
economic situation and for effective policymaking. Poor-quality statistics may lead to 
poor economic analysis, mistaken conclusions about the behaviour of economic agents 
and inappropriate policy decisions. The quality of the budgetary statistics of Member 
States is particularly important given that these statistics are the foundation of a 
budgetary surveillance framework in a multi-country context (European Commission, 
2003, in particular section II.4 thereof).  
The quality of statistics can be generically defined as fitness for use (OECD, 2003). This 
encompasses all aspects of how well statistics meet users’ needs and their expectations 
about the information content of the disseminated data (Damia and Picón Aguilar (2006), 
quoting the Encyclopaedia of Statistical Sciences). The quality of statistics is a 
multidimensional concept. The data quality assessment framework (DQAF) for 
government finance statistics of the IMF (2003) identifies the following dimensions of 
quality: (i) integrity, (ii) methodological soundness, (iii) accuracy and reliability, (iv) 
serviceability and (v) accessibility, as well as a number of (vi) prerequisites of quality. 
These dimensions of quality can be broken down into a number of quality elements, 
notably relevance, transparency, timeliness, punctuality, consistency, completeness, 
comparability across time and space, interpretability, credibility, plausibility and cost-
efficiency. The UN, OECD and Eurostat identify slightly different dimensions of 
statistical quality, or define them in slightly different ways, but differences are more 
semantic than substance.9 
Statistics are accurate if they sufficiently portray reality. Accuracy is thus related to the 
discrepancy between statistics and the unknown “true” figures they are intended to 
measure. This discrepancy can be separated into two components. The first is the 
difference between final figures and reality. The measurement of this discrepancy is very 
                                                                                                                                                 
fiscal situation at the time when it is most needed – during and not after, or much after, the fiscal 
year”. Balassone et al. (2003) recall that the overall statistical framework and its complexity was not 
designed to support the enforcement of rules and even suggest redefining the reference deficit as the 
change in nominal debt, with benefits in timeliness and transparency. Buti (2006) also pleads for 
simple rules as a way of increasing the reliability of data. 
8  We are not aware of any similar paper for the US. The comparison between revisions in the US 
government finance statistics and the EU Member States is a topic for further research. 
9  See e.g. De Vries (2002), Eurostat (2003), IMF (2003), OECD (2003), Saeboe (2003), Giovannini 
(2004). For a comparison between the IMF’s data quality assessment framework and Eurostat’s 
quality definition, see Laliberté et al. (2004) and Laliberté and Defays (2006). 
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complex, since the “true” figures are not observable. The second is reliability. This is the 
difference between the first published data and the final figures. (Bier and Ahnert, 2001, 
and Carson and Laliberté, 2002). Therefore, reliability (or stability) of data refers to the 
closeness of the initial estimated values – which are those which are more relevant for 
policymaking – to the subsequently revised values.  
The dimension of statistical quality that is discussed in the paper is reliability. However, 
several dimensions of statistical quality, other than reliability, are of the utmost relevance 
for fiscal surveillance. There are interesting parallels between the dimensions of 
statistical quality and the ideal qualities of fiscal rules as presented in the academic 
literature: namely that they should be well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible, 
adequate to final goal, enforceable, consistent, and linked with structural reform (Kopits 
and Symansky, 1998). Fiscal rules will not be enforceable if fiscal statistics are not 
timely and reliable; the transparency of the fiscal numerical rules is directly connected 
with the transparency of the available data; simple rules (e.g. those that refer to a single 
numerical indicator with a small or no margin for judgement) will be adequate to the 
final goal only if the numerical indicator is very accurate and relevant; more flexible 
fiscal rules which allow a wider margin of judgement will be less dependent on the 
accuracy of the numerical indicators (Buti, 2006). 
Moreover, the dimensions of statistical quality are not independent from each other. 
There are trade-offs between several dimensions, for example between timeliness and 
reliability (Bier and Ahnert, 2001); integrity, reliability and accuracy; completeness and 
comparability; methodological soundness and comparability across time; etc.  
Therefore, any conclusion on the reliability of data of any country cannot be understood 
as an overall assessment of the quality of their data, nor on the fitness of these data for 
use in fiscal surveillance. The reliability of government data is a necessary but by no 
means sufficient condition for the fitness of data for use in fiscal surveillance.  
3.  DATA AVAILABLE AND RELIABILITY INDICATORS 
The EU Member States compile and publish government deficit and debt figures at their 
own pace. For example, in Germany, the deficit and debt figures are usually published 
very shortly after the end of the respective year. Deficit data for 2005 were published by 
the German Statistical Office on 12 January 2006; a first revision, together with detailed 
revenue and expenditure accounts, was released on 22 February 2006.10 Other EU 
countries publish their data somewhat later. 
However, all EU Member States are under an obligation to report their deficit and debt 
figures to the Commission at precise dates in spring and autumn each year. Such figures 
– together with the Commission services’ forecasts, which are published shortly after the 
fiscal reporting – constitute the raw material on the basis of which fiscal surveillance 
procedures are put in motion. Each data transmission covers the previous four years. 
After four years, or eight notifications, it is assumed that data are final; they then drop 
from the data transmission. In other words, data for year t are reported for the first time 
in spring t+1 and revised until autumn t+4: 42 months after the transmission of the first 
outcome, or 45 months after the end of the year to which they refer. These 
extraordinarily long lags for the publication of final data illustrate just how demanding 
                                                 
10  See Destatis Press Release of 22 February 2006. 
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the task of compiling government deficit and debt figures is. Some countries keep 
revising their data after four years; however, for the purpose of this paper, we will 
assume that data of all countries are final after four years 
The available sample consists of data reported to the Commission by Member States 
between March 1994 and October 2006.11 Each data transmission includes data with 
different revision histories. In spring t, data for t-1 are transmitted for the first time, data 
for t-2 are transmitted for the third time, data for t-3 are transmitted for the fifth time and 
data for t-4 are transmitted for the seventh time. The second, fourth, sixth and eight 
transmissions take place in autumn. To simplify, we will say that each data transmission 
(also called a data vintage) contains data of different ages: ages 1, 3, 5 and 7 in spring, 
and 2, 4, 6 and 8 in autumn.  
For each country, there are 104 observations, that is, 13 observations of each age.12 The 
analysis concerns 14 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. We have excluded Greece from most of the analysis, given that the very large 
revisions of a structural nature, which took place between autumn 2002 and autumn 
2006, cannot be used to infer anything about potential future revisions. Because of data 
availability issues, the assessment of the reliability of reported deficit figures does not 
concern the ten new Member States, which have reported their data under the same 
conditions as other Member States since spring 2004 only.  
Data of age 2 are expected to be more reliable – i.e. closer to final data – than data of age 
1, data of age 3 are expected to be more reliable than data of age 2, and so on. As a 
result, for each of the 14 countries considered, there are 8 different samples of 13 
observations each. These are short samples for statistical inference purposes; as a result, 
reliability indicators need to be interpreted carefully and prudence is necessary in the 
conclusions. 
The most relevant statistics for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact are 
the ratios-to-GDP of the government deficit and debt. Revisions in the deficit and debt 
ratios can occur because of revisions in the numerators and denominators, that is, 
because of revisions in the deficit and debt figures, or revisions in the GDP levels. This 
paper is concerned about the revisions in the deficit and debt levels only. We disregard 
the fact that the nominal GDP figures are also subject to revisions.13 However, since 
there is a need to standardise data, to make them comparable across time and across 
countries, our calculations are as a percentage of the latest available GDP series.  
Table 1 summarises the available sample of deficit revisions. The number of revisions 
falling in each of five brackets (large and medium-size revisions that reduce the deficit, 
small revisions, and large and medium-size revisions that increase the deficit) is 
indicated. In relation to the central bracket corresponding to small revisions, the table 
also reports on the deficit-increasing revisions and on very small revisions. As expected, 
the number of small revisions (revisions in the deficit ratios between -0.2 and 0.2% of 
GDP), and very small revisions (revisions between -0.05% and 0.05% of GDP) tends to 
                                                 
11  Deficit and debt data reported by Member States since 1994 are available from the authors upon 
request. 
12  The number of observations for Austria, Sweden and Finland, which have reported their data to the 
Commission since their accession to the EU in 1995, is 96. 
13  See Annex I. On GDP revisions, see also Aruoba (2005) and Di Fonzo (2005). 
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increase with the data ages, while the number of very large revisions (the first and fifth 
column corresponding to revisions in the deficit ratios below -0.5% and above 0.5% of 
GDP) falls. Moreover, the table suggests normality in the revisions (see Annex I.3). 
 
Table 1: Sample available – Revisions in government deficit between two consecutive data 
transmissions  
x<-0.5% -0.5%<x<-0.2% -0.2%<x<0.2% 0.2%<x<0.5% 0.5%<x TOTAL
Total Of which: Of which:
0.0%<x<0.2% -0.05%<x<0.05%
1st 7 16 123 62 58 25 11 182
2nd 4 20 125 55 59 15 4 168
3rd 6 13 147 55 85 13 3 182
4th 6 17 131 53 82 11 3 168
5th 2 7 160 51 110 11 2 182
6th 2 16 144 54 104 2 4 168
7th 2 5 167 48 129 6 2 182
TOTAL 29 94 997 378 627 83 29 1232
Size of revisions in % of GDP
 
Note: The table summarises the revisions in government deficit data in the sample. Revisions are classified 
according to the number of revisions (lines) and their size (columns). A first revision for a given year 
corresponds to the difference between the first and the second data transmissions, i.e., data for year t 
reported in spring t+1 and autumn t+1. Second revisions correspond to the differences between the second 
and the third data transmissions, i.e. data for year t reported in autumn t+1 and spring t+2, and so on. 
Positive revisions (+) mean increases in deficits or reductions in surpluses; negative revisions (–) mean 
reductions in deficits or increases in surpluses. As expected, the number of small revisions (between -0.2 
and 0.2% of GDP) and very small revisions (between -0.05% and 0.05% of GDP) increases with the data 
age, while the number of very large revisions (revisions in the deficit ratios below -0.5% and above 0.5% 
of GDP) falls.  
 
Not all data revisions have the same nature. Data are typically revised because new 
information on government transactions becomes available, errors or inconsistencies are 
identified and corrected, or as a result of the continuous efforts to better comply with the 
intricacies of the accounting rules: these are routine revisions. We may conjecture that 
the size of the routine revisions differs among countries because of the size of the 
country, the institutional arrangements in place, including the degree of decentralisation 
of government, the technical arrangements put in place to collect data from each 
government unit, the habits and obligations in the production of source data by each of 
the government units, the similarity between the accounting standards in use in each of 
government unit and the national accounting rules, the available resources and 
technologies to compile the first outcome and to revise data, as well as the complexity of 
the transactions carried out by each country, etc. There are also structural revisions of 
data series, when the accounting rules are significantly revised (for example the shift of 
ESA79 to ESA95 at the beginning of 2000, or clarifications to accounting rules 
published by Eurostat14), major systemic changes in the data compilation, or when 
exceptionally large errors in the accounts are identified and corrected.15 
                                                 
14  Since 1996, Eurostat has regularly published clarifications on the implementation of ESA. These 
clarifications are compiled in a “Manual on government deficit and debt”. The manual, together with 
updates, is available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=2373,47631312,2373_ 
58674363&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. 
15  Aruoba (2005) uses the terms ‘informative’ and ‘uninformative’ revisions to refer to what we call 
‘routine’ and ‘structural’ revisions. 
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In this paper, we are interested in calculating indicators of reliability, and inferring the 
size of future revisions. Because of their nature, nothing can be inferred about future 
revisions on the basis of the structural revisions in the past. The fact that ESA79 was 
replaced with ESA95 as the accounting standard for the compilation of government 
accounts in spring 2000, and that such a methodological change led to revisions in 
government accounts, does not suggest similar revisions will take place in the coming 
years, when they will take place, or what will be the consequences for the time series of 
another large methodological change of the similar nature. In principle, we are interested 
in the routine revisions only.16  
Therefore, structural revisions should be identified and removed from the sample. 
However, given the difficulty in identifying structural revisions and of distinguishing 
them from routine revisions, we have abstained from attempting doing so in a systematic 
way.17 The only structural revisions that we have specifically identified and removed 
from the sample are those corresponding to the shift from the ESA79 to ESA95 at the 
beginning of 2000, which was relevant for all Member States, and the breaks in the 
Danish series in connection with the sectoral classification of pension schemes (see 
Annex II.1). This implies that, for a number of countries that have undergone structural 
revisions in their statistical system over the last fifteen years or so, we may be 
underestimating the reliability of their data.18  
4. COMPARING THE RELIABILITY OF DEFICIT DATA AMONG DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
Studying how deficit figures have been revised since 1994 allows Member States to be 
compared and ranked. Tables 2 to 4 show, for each Member State, data on standard 
deviations in revisions, average of revisions and average of revisions in absolute values 
between each data age (1 to 7) and final data (age 8). The most relevant indicators 
correspond to the revisions from the first transmission (of spring t+1) to final data (of 
autumn t+4); however, the tables show indicators for each data age.19 
The standard deviation of the deficit revisions is shown in table 2. It indicates the 
precision of the average revision as an estimator of future revisions. According to this 
indicator, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the countries that have reported 
the most reliable deficit figures. For France and Germany, the standard deviation of 
revisions from the first transmission to final data has been below 0.3% of GDP, while the 
UK data are only slightly above that mark (see column 1). The French figures remain the 
most reliable until age 5, when the data of almost all countries are already very close to 
final. It is remarkable that the French figures of age 1 are more reliable than the data of 
many other countries of more advanced ages. For example, it is only at the 5th 
                                                 
16  For example, the very large revisions in the Greek government accounts in 2002 and from 2004 to 
2006 were of a structural and systemic nature and cannot be taken as an indication that similar 
revisions will occur in the future. 
17  It should be noted that structural and routine revisions are not distinguishable by their size, but by 
their nature, and that structural and routine revisions may either add up or offset each other. The 
revision in the Finnish figures quoted in footnote 4 was clearly a routine revision, though it amounted 
to almost 1% of GDP. Most revisions because of the structural shift from ESA79 to ESA 95 were 
much smaller in size. 
18  An illustration of the effect of removing structural revisions other than the shift from ESA79 to 
ESA95 for Portugal and Sweden – two of the countries most affected by structural breaks – features in 
Annex II.2. 
19  Annex I provides some further explanations about the process of calculating these indicators and some 
underlying issues. 
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transmission that the Italian figures reach the same reliability of French figures of age 1. 
Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg are the countries with the largest dispersion of the 
revisions from age 1 to final data. In particular, the Danish and Swedish data20 remain 
much more susceptible to revisions compared to other Member States until ages 6 and 7, 
as revisions in their data have tended to be published relatively late.21  
 
Table 2: Member States ranked by the standard deviation of revisions in deficit data (% of GDP)  
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 FR(0.23%) FR(0.21%) FR(0.16%) FR(0.14%) FR(0.11%) NL(0.06%) SE(0.00%)
2 DE(0.29%) UK(0.23%) UK(0.18%) UK(0.15%) UK(0.12%) FR(0.08%) FI(0.04%)
3 UK(0.31%) DE(0.23%) FI(0.21%) DE(0.18%) DE(0.12%) AT(0.08%) FR(0.05%)
4 BE(0.37%) NL(0.29%) DE(0.23%) NL(0.18%) AT(0.13%) UK(0.09%) AT(0.05%)
5 IE(0.39%) FI(0.30%) NL(0.27%) FI(0.19%) FI(0.13%) DE(0.09%) NL(0.06%)
6 FI(0.40%) BE(0.34%) AT(0.27%) AT(0.22%) NL(0.18%) FI(0.13%) UK(0.07%)
7 ES(0.42%) IE(0.35%) IE(0.30%) ES(0.26%) IT(0.23%) LU(0.18%) DE(0.08%)
8 AT(0.45%) AT(0.36%) BE(0.33%) IE(0.26%) IE(0.23%) ES(0.18%) PT(0.11%)
9 NL(0.51%) ES(0.36%) ES(0.34%) BE(0.29%) ES(0.25%) IE(0.19%) LU(0.11%)
10 IT(0.53%) IT(0.48%) IT(0.43%) PT(0.32%) LU(0.26%) BE(0.20%) IT(0.12%)
11 DK(0.74%) PT(0.54%) PT(0.47%) IT(0.33%) PT(0.28%) IT(0.21%) BE(0.17%)
12 PT(0.78%) DK(0.67%) DK(0.61%) LU(0.41%) BE(0.29%) PT(0.25%) ES(0.17%)
13 LU(0.92%) LU(0.71%) LU(0.62%) DK(0.60%) SE(0.53%) DK(0.48%) IE(0.18%)
14 SE(1.01%) SE(1.00%) SE(0.88%) SE(0.87%) DK(0.56%) SE(0.53%) DK(0.47%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the standard deviations of revisions between any given data transmission and final 
data. The first column corresponds to the revisions between the first outturn for year t reported in spring 
t+1 and final data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A higher value in standard deviation of 
the revisions means more dispersion in deficit data for a given year over different data transmissions and a 
worse position of the country in terms of reliability. The reduction in the standard deviations for each 
country when advancing in data transmissions (from 1st to 2nd and so on) shows the pace at which data 
progress to final. 
 
As far as the average revisions are concerned (Table 3), the two countries with the largest 
deficit-reducing (or surplus-increasing) revisions from data of age 1 to final (column 1) 
are Luxembourg and Belgium. The two countries with largest average of deficit-
increasing revisions are Portugal and Italy.22 It is worth noting that Portugal and Italy 
appear among the countries with the largest deficit-increasing revisions until age 4 (in 
autumn t+2). Note, however, that given the large standard deviation reported above, the 
                                                 
20  It should be noted that at the 7th transmission, Sweden jumps from the last to the first place in the 
ranking, when its standard deviation becomes zero. This means that in spite of relatively large errors, 
the revision process in Sweden stops somewhat earlier than in other Member States. 
21  As explained above, Greece was not considered in most of the analysis, and data are not 
systematically reported in tables and charts. The standard deviation of revisions in deficit data for 
Greece from the 1st transmission to final data is 1.92% of GDP. 
22  The average of revisions in deficit data in Greece from the 1st transmission to final data is -1.60% of 
GDP. 
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average revisions in all countries are not significantly different from zero at the usual 
significance levels. It is remarkable that, while the Swedish figures have been subject to 
large revisions, as measured by the standard deviations (Table 2), Sweden has been 
among the countries with the smallest average revisions, that is, its revisions have 
cancelled each other. 
Table 4 shows the average of deficit data revisions in absolute value for all countries; it 
complements the results shown in Table 3. Given that Table 4 treats deficit-increasing 
and deficit-decreasing revisions identically and avoids revisions offsetting each other, the 
information in Table 4 is quite similar to Table 1, with this indicator showing the French, 
German and British figures to be the most reliable, and Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Denmark reporting data subject to the largest revisions in absolute value. 
 
Table 3: Member States ranked by the average of revisions in deficit data (% of GDP) 
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 LU(0.75%) LU(0.14%) SE(0.15%) SE(0.11%) SE(0.19%) SE(0.19%) IE(0.06%)
2 BE(0.27%) BE(0.10%) LU(0.09%) FI(0.08%) IE(0.05%) IE(0.08%) BE(0.05%)
3 IE(0.09%) FI(0.08%) BE(0.09%) IE(0.05%) DE(0.02%) DE(0.02%) DE(0.02%)
4 DK(0.05%) IE(0.05%) FI(0.07%) DK(0.03%) FI(0.02%) BE(0.01%) FI(0.01%)
5 FI(-0.01%) SE(-0.01%) IE(0.04%) FR(0.02%) ES(0.02%) FI(0.01%) IT(0.01%)
6 AT(-0.02%) FR(-0.02%) FR(0.01%) BE(0.01%) BE(0.01%) FR(-0.01%) ES(0.00%)
7 SE(-0.03%) DK(-0.05%) DK(-0.02%) DE(-0.02%) DK(0.01%) NL(-0.02%) FR(0.00%)
8 FR(-0.03%) UK(-0.05%) UK(-0.04%) ES(-0.02%) FR(-0.01%) PT(-0.03%) SE(0.00%)
9 DE(-0.03%) DE(-0.09%) DE(-0.07%) LU(-0.04%) IT(-0.04%) ES(-0.03%) DK(-0.01%)
10 UK(-0.09%) ES(-0.10%) ES(-0.11%) NL(-0.04%) PT(-0.05%) AT(-0.03%) NL(-0.02%)
11 ES(-0.16%) AT(-0.10%) AT(-0.11%) UK(-0.04%) AT(-0.05%) IT(-0.05%) UK(-0.03%)
12 NL(-0.17%) NL(-0.14%) NL(-0.12%) PT(-0.08%) UK(-0.06%) UK(-0.05%) PT(-0.03%)
13 IT(-0.40%) PT(-0.32%) PT(-0.22%) AT(-0.13%) LU(-0.06%) DK(-0.06%) AT(-0.03%)
14 PT(-0.40%) IT(-0.32%) IT(-0.23%) IT(-0.13%) NL(-0.06%) LU(-0.08%) LU(-0.05%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the average revisions between any given data transmission and final data. The first 
column corresponds to the revisions between the first outturn for year t reported in spring t+1 and final 
data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A negative (positive) value means an expected 
increase (reduction) in the deficit.  
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Table 4: Member States ranked by the average of revisions in deficit data in absolute values (% of 
GDP) 
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 FR(0.33%) FR(0.28%) FR(0.18%) FR(0.15%) FI(0.09%) NL(0.03%) SE(0.00%)
2 DE(0.44%) DE(0.31%) FI(0.23%) NL(0.16%) FR(0.10%) FR(0.06%) FI(0.01%)
3 UK(0.52%) UK(0.35%) UK(0.24%) UK(0.16%) DE(0.11%) DE(0.06%) NL(0.02%)
4 ES(0.56%) NL(0.35%) DE(0.29%) FI(0.17%) UK(0.12%) AT(0.07%) FR(0.03%)
5 FI(0.60%) FI(0.40%) NL(0.30%) DE(0.18%) NL(0.14%) UK(0.07%) AT(0.03%)
6 NL(0.66%) ES(0.43%) ES(0.37%) ES(0.21%) AT(0.14%) FI(0.07%) DE(0.04%)
7 BE(0.67%) BE(0.48%) AT(0.37%) AT(0.26%) ES(0.16%) ES(0.11%) IT(0.04%)
8 IE(0.69%) AT(0.50%) IE(0.43%) BE(0.34%) IT(0.19%) IE(0.14%) UK(0.05%)
9 IT(0.70%) IE(0.56%) IT(0.45%) IE(0.34%) IE(0.25%) IT(0.15%) PT(0.05%)
10 AT(0.71%) IT(0.62%) BE(0.46%) IT(0.35%) SE(0.25%) BE(0.16%) ES(0.08%)
11 PT(0.93%) PT(0.67%) PT(0.51%) PT(0.37%) PT(0.27%) LU(0.18%) LU(0.09%)
12 DK(1.09%) DK(0.84%) DK(0.61%) DK(0.55%) BE(0.31%) PT(0.19%) IE(0.10%)
13 SE(1.10%) SE(1.01%) SE(0.70%) LU(0.57%) LU(0.32%) SE(0.25%) BE(0.12%)
14 LU(1.86%) LU(1.20%) LU(0.92%) SE(0.65%) DK(0.43%) DK(0.31%) DK(0.22%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the average revisions in absolute values between any given data transmission and 
final data. The first column corresponds to the absolute revisions between the first outturn for year t 
reported in spring t+1 and final data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A higher value in this 
indicator means a worse position on reliability.  
 
Data in Tables 2 and 4 – in particular the fact that the three largest EU countries, 
Germany, France and the UK, have reported the most reliable figures – suggest that there 
is some link between the size of countries and the reliability of their data, with the largest 
countries reporting better data. It is not clear whether this is because of institutional 
issues, economies of scale or critical mass, or because of some implication of the laws of 
large numbers (compilation errors have a visible impact in the accounts of small 
countries, while they may offset each other for large countries). In any case, the example 
of Italy – which appears much lower in the rankings than much smaller countries, such as 
Ireland and Finland – shows that the link is tenuous. The causes of the differences in 
reliability among Member States is a topic for future research.   
5. INFERRING FUTURE REVISIONS 
Information on the reliability of the deficit can be summarised in fan charts (see Figure 
1). The fan charts are an efficient way of illustrating the uncertainty surrounding the 
deficit figures for the latest years. The charts depict how the deficit figures for recent 
years – which are not yet final – are susceptible to revision, based on the pattern of data 
revisions in the past. For every country, there are two charts. For each chart, the thick 
line depicts the latest available deficit ratios. Charts on the left-hand side show intervals 
of confidence for data to be reported in future data transmissions until data become final. 
That is, how data for 2003 will be reported by autumn 2007, data for 2004 will be 
reported by autumn 2008, and data for 2005 will be reported by autumn 2009. Data for 
years 2002 and earlier are no longer covered by the fiscal reporting and are, therefore, 
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final. As expected, the confidence intervals around the thick line are wider for years 
which are still at an earlier stage of revision. 
The intervals defined by the dotted and dashed lines correspond to confidence levels of 
60% (a particularly low confidence level, uncommon in statistical analysis, which 
illustrates that deficit data are susceptible of large revisions) and 90%. This means that 
there is a probability of 60% that final deficit data will be between lines B and C, and 
90% between lines A and D (see the chart for Belgium). In the context of fiscal 
surveillance in the EU, deficit-increasing revisions are of much more concern than 
deficit-reducing revisions; the unilateral confidence levels (i.e. probabilities that the 
government balance after the final revision will remain above lines C and D) are 80% 
and 95%, respectively.23  
Charts on the right-hand side show intervals at a confidence level of 90% for the next 
data transmission. That is how data are susceptible of being revised in spring 2007.24 The 
unilateral confidence level is 95%. 
Figure 1: Fan charts illustrating the reliability of deficit statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  The intervals of confidence have been calculated on the basis of the average revision, the standard 
deviations in revisions from each data transmission to final, assuming that the revisions are normally 
distributed. 
24  In spring 2007, there will be a major structural revision in the Danish and Swedish government 
accounts relating to the transitory period on the sectoral classification of pension schemes. Such a 
structural revision is not considered in the charts of Figure 1; it will reduce the Danish and Swedish 
surpluses by around 1% of GDP. See, for further details, European Commission (2006b, in particular 
Box 1.5). 
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Italy: total revision
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Portugal: total revision
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Note: This series of charts show the latest available deficit series (the thick line) and confidence intervals 
surrounding those figures. The dotted and the dashed lines show how the deficit figures are susceptible of 
revision until they become final (left-hand side charts). There is a probability of 60% that data will be 
comprised between lines B and C, and of 90% between lines A and D (see the first chart for Belgium). In 
terms of unilateral confidence levels, there is a probability of 80% that the deficit/surplus will not go below 
line C and of 95% that it will not go below line D. For the next data transmission (right-had side charts), 
the bilateral confidence level is 90%; the unilateral confidence level is 95%. 
 
6. COMPARING DEFICIT AND DEBT REVISIONS 
Debt figures are often assumed to be more reliable than deficit figures.25 This is because 
accounting rules for debt are much simpler than those for deficits (debt is a cash-based 
concept which is directly observable and for which data are easier to compile than 
deficits which are calculated on an accrual basis), and because the deficit is a balancing 
flow that is influenced by all changes in other items of government accounts, while debt 
is a stock, which by nature is more inert than a flow. The idea that the deficit figures are 
less reliable also comes from the fact that the deficit has been a more politically sensitive 
variable.26 Therefore, the governments have more interest in underestimating the deficit 
figures in the first data transmission, even if the data will be revised at a later stage. In 
this section, we test whether this view is well founded. 
A direct comparison between the reliability indicators of the deficit and debt figures as 
those shown in sections 4 and 5 would be meaningless, because of differences in the size 
and nature of both concepts.27 A meaningful comparison of the reliability of deficit and 
debt must take into account these differences. We suggest comparing the reliability of 
deficit and debt figures through two complementary approaches. 
                                                 
25  Although the government deficit/surplus is the main driver of the government debt, the yearly change 
in the government debt does not exactly correspond to the government deficit. The difference is 
known as stock-flow adjustment (or SFA). For further details on the components of the stock-flow 
adjustment, and a theoretical model on the authorities’ behaviour in relation to deficits, debt and SFA 
in the presence of fiscal rules, see Buti et al (2006). 
26  Balassone et al. (2003, 2006a and b), Buti et al. (2006) and Koen and van den Noord (2006).  
27  Annex III provides a series of indicators on the revisions of debt data, similar to those shown above 
for the deficit.  
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The first approach is to calculate a coefficient of reliability standardised by volatility 
(CRSV). We have defined the CRSV as the standard deviation of the revisions for every 
data age divided by the volatility of the underlying series. The volatility of each series 
(deficit and debt) is measured by the standard deviation of the yearly changes. The 
CRSV is a noise-to-signal ratio. The rationale of the CRSV is that volatile series are 
more difficult to compile in a timely way and therefore require larger revisions. A higher 
value in CRSV means less relative reliability.  
Charts in Figure 3 show the evolution of CRSV by age and country for deficit and debt 
figures. Since data of age 8 are defined as final, the CRSV for age 8 for all series is zero, 
by construction. Although the CRSV of deficit and debt can be compared for each age, 
the most useful comparison is for age 1, that is, for the first data transmissions. Debt 
figures have been more relatively reliable than deficit figures for Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, 
the reverse is true for Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal. 
 
Figure 4: Coefficients of reliability of deficit and debt standardised by volatility 
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Note: This series of charts compare the coefficients of reliability standardised by volatility (CRSV) of 
deficit and debt ratios of different ages. The CRSV is calculated as the standard deviations of revisions 
divided by the standard deviation of year-on-year changes of the underlying series. A smaller coefficient 
for deficit (debt) indicates that deficit (debt) figures are relatively more reliable. 
 
A second approach to compare the reliability of deficit and debt figures is to compare the 
revisions in deficit figures and the revisions in the yearly changes in debt, where the 
comparison is between two flows of similar sizes. This approach is the more relevant if 
one is interested in the debt developments to countercheck the plausibility of deficit 
figures. The charts in Figure 4 show the evolution of the standard deviations in the 
revisions of deficit and yearly change in debt figures. Since assessing changes in debt 
implies a comparison of two years’ data reported at the same time, the analysis only 
concerns the first six data transmissions. 
These charts have been complemented by F tests to establish whether the differences 
between the standard deviations of the deficit and change-in-debt revisions are 
statistically significant. The conclusions derived from the charts and the F tests are that, 
as far as data of age 1 are concerned, the figures on the yearly changes in debt are 
effectively more reliable than the deficit for Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy and 
Portugal. Therefore, for these countries, the yearly change in debt may be used to 
countercheck the plausibility of deficit figures, and even to anticipate future deficit 
revisions. However, the results for Belgium, France, Austria and Finland go against the 
received wisdom, with their deficit figures more reliable than the debt figures. For, 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden, the differences in the standard deviations 
are not statistically significant. 
We conjecture that differences in the relative reliability of deficit and debt data come 
from the institutional arrangements for the compilation of deficit and debt figures, which 
in several countries are not compiled by the same institution, debt decentralisation and 
the size of government liabilities held by other government units (that is, liabilities which 
are consolidated when calculating the overall government debt).  
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Figure 4: Comparing the reliability of deficit and change in debt data: evolution of the standard 
deviations of revisions 
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Note: This series of charts compares the evolution of the standard deviations of deficits and yearly changes 
in debt. When the yearly change in debt is more reliable (i.e. smaller standard deviation) than the deficit, 
debt figures can be used to assess the plausibility of, and anticipate revisions in, deficit figures.   
 
7. EVOLUTION OF RELIABILITY OVER TIME 
The process of compiling government accounts has changed quite considerably over the 
last 15 years. Technological advances in the automated collection and processing of data, 
the development of quarterly accounts and an increase in the awareness of the relevance 
of reliable government accounts may have led to an increase in the reliability of data. 
The increasing relevance of government accounts has also led to an upgrade in the 
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quantity and quality of resources dedicated to compiling government accounts in 
Member States. Therefore, first outturns may be closer to final data than they used to be. 
At the same time, the shift from ESA79 to ESA95 may have led to an increase in the 
complexity of accounting rules – for example a wider application of the accruals 
principle – which would imply larger revisions. Moreover, the EU governments have 
participated more and more in complex transactions – such as securitisation or private-
public partnerships – that raise accounting difficulties and often entail large revisions. 
The fact that Eurostat now scrutinises the accounts reported by Member States in much 
more detail than it used to do in the past may also have led to changes in the way data are 
compiled and revised.  
In order to reach conclusions on the evolution of reliability over time for the deficit data, 
we have pooled data of the fourteen countries, and split the sample into two periods. The 
first period includes data corresponding to data transmissions under ESA79, that is from 
spring 1994 until autumn 1999; the second period includes data compiled under ESA95 
since spring 2000. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution in the standard deviation in the revisions for the pooled 
sample and for the sub-samples ESA79 and ESA95. The standard deviations of the 
cumulated revisions from the first transmission to final data are practically the same 
under ESA79 and ESA95 while the data transmitted from the second to the sixth 
transmission appear more reliable under ESA95 than under ESA79. F tests confirm this 
finding. This indicates that figures compiled since 2000 under ESA95 converge quicker 
to final than data compiled prior to 2000. This faster convergence to final data may be 
connected with the fact that until 2000, several Member States used to revise the 
complete government expenditure and revenue account only once a year. Therefore, 
while one cannot conclude that ESA95 data are more reliable that ESA79 data, the 
conjecture that the shift from ESA79 to ESA95 has harmed the reliability of data is not 
confirmed by the evidence.28,29 
                                                 
28  To check the robustness of our finding, we performed the same exercise for the group of countries that 
have ranked lower in terms of reliability (Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Luxembourg and 
Sweden; see the ranking in table 2). For this group, the standard deviation in revisions from age 1 to 
final data for ESA95 is slightly higher than for ESA79, while the reverse is true for other ages (2 to 7). 
However, the differences in the standard deviations are not significant for any age. 
29  We have also compared the evolution of the average of revisions in absolute value under ESA79 and 
ESA95. The conclusions are the same as reported above for the standard deviation. Our finding that 
there has not been a general deterioration in the reliability in data reported prior and after the shift to 
ESA95 is not necessarily valid for each specific country. Given the small samples available, it is not 
possible to check whether the general finding is applicable to each individual country. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of reliability (standard deviation of revisions) of deficit under ESA79 and 
ESA95 
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Note: This chart compares the evolution of the standard deviations of the revisions in deficits between each 
given age and final data, when compiled under ESA79 and under ESA95. The conjecture according to 
which the shift from ESA79 to ESA95 has harmed the reliability of data is not confirmed by the evidence. 
Actually, data compiled since 2000 under ESA95 converge faster to final data. 
 
8. COMPARING SIZE OF REVISIONS AND SIZE OF DEFICIT 
We have also investigated whether the size of the deficit has an impact on the revisions. 
From the data compiler viewpoint, there is no obvious reason for the size of the deficit to 
have an impact on the pattern of revisions. That is, there is no reason to expect that the 
errors that require correction and underlie future revisions are significantly different 
when the deficit is high or low, when one is in deficit or when one is in surplus. 
However, in the context of SGP and the related procedures, the reference value of 3% of 
GDP for the deficit plays a crucial role. Statistical authorities are certainly not insensitive 
to the political consequences of the revisions.30 A revision which increases or reduces a 
surplus or that increases or reduces a large deficit does not have the same consequences 
as a revision that leads the deficit ratio to cross the bar of 3% of GDP. 
To check whether the size of the deficit ratio has an impact on the pattern of revisions, 
we have pooled all revisions (i.e. of all countries and of all vintages) in a total of 1232 
observations. This sample has been divided into five groups. The first group includes 
revisions affecting deficits which prior to the revisions are above 3.5% of GDP, while the 
second group covers revisions of deficits between 3.0% and 3.5% of GDP. The third 
group encloses the most sensitive revisions in the sense that they affect deficits between 
                                                 
30   For a synopsis of the recent debate on the institutional independence of data compilers, see European 
Commission (2006a, in particular section II.4.4.4). 
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2.5% and 3% of GDP; this group includes the cases where relatively small deficit-
increasing revisions could imply crossing the 3%-of-GDP threshold. The fourth group 
includes revisions affecting deficits between 2.5% and 2.0% of GDP and the last one, 
revisions of deficits lower than 2.0% or surpluses. The sample distributed within the five 
groups is shown in Figure 6.  
The figure suggests that the revisions of critical deficit figures – that is of deficit figures 
that are slightly below 3% of GDP – are smaller than the revisions when the government 
balance prior to the revisions is far from 3%. F tests confirm that the standard deviation 
of revisions in group 3 is significantly smaller than in any other group. Note, however, 
that revisions of group 3 are symmetric. 
 
Figure 6: Relation between size of revision and size of deficit (-) or surplus (+)  
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Note: The revisions in deficit figures have been plotted according to their size and the deficit (or surplus) 
prior to the revisions. The chart suggests that deficits slightly below the reference value of 3% of GDP 
(group 3) have been revised by less than when the deficit is above, or much below 3% of GDP. 
 
Figure 7 also provides information on the standard deviation of revisions for group 3 
(deficits prior to the revision slightly below 3% of GDP) and the other groups for a 
number of countries. The figure does not cover all countries, as several of them never 
reported deficits between 2.5 and 3% of GDP. It confirms the findings of Figure 6 that 
the revisions of deficits slightly below 3% of GDP are smaller than revisions in other 
circumstances. 
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Figure 7: Standard deviations of deficit revisions by country and size of deficits  
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Note: The chart shows the standard deviations of revisions for group 3 (deficits prior to the revision 
slightly below 3% of GDP) and the other groups for a number of countries. It confirms that revisions of 
deficit when the deficit prior to the revision is slightly below 3% (group 3) are usually smaller than for 
other deficit values. The chart does not cover all countries, as several of them never reported deficits 
between 2.5% and 3% of GDP. 
 
There are several possible interpretations for Figures 6 and 7. A first interpretation is that 
deficit data are more carefully compiled when the deficit is close to 3% of GDP and, as a 
result, subsequent revisions are smaller. A more disturbing interpretation would be that 
statisticians refrain from revising their data with the same rigour when the deficit is very 
close to the reference value of 3% of GDP, as if they were afraid of the political 
consequences of revisions resulting in the reference value being crossed. If this second 
interpretation were correct, then one might expect larger revisions around the 3%-of-
GDP mark very late – when data are no longer officially transmitted to the Commission 
for SGP purposes and therefore not covered by our analysis – or that data reach final 
status before all potential revisions have been implemented. However, further research 
would be necessary before drawing definitive conclusions on this topic. 
9. CONCLUSIONS  
The time frames for SGP-related policy decisions on the one hand, and of publication 
and revision of deficit and debt figures on the other, are quite different, the former being 
much faster than the latter. The first outturns of government accounts are subject to wider 
margins of error than the implementation of the fiscal surveillance procedure would 
require. On a number of occasions, this has generated stress and problems of credibility, 
yet clearly the fiscal surveillance procedures cannot simply be stopped in order to wait 
until final data are available. 
The fact that it takes so long to get final data and that policy decisions are taken on the 
basis of preliminary information is not new and is not specific to the Stability and 
Growth Pact. In their decision-making process, policy-makers must keep in mind that the 
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available information is not perfect and subject to revision. However, given that fiscal 
surveillance in the EU is primarily based on the evolution of specific indicators and the 
respect of specific ceilings or targets, it is necessary to take those errors explicitly into 
account. This means that those that decide on the SGP-related procedure must be aware 
that fiscal statistics are susceptible to relatively large revisions until very late and that the 
size of these revisions differs from country to country. Although the Commission cannot 
predict how reported data will be revised, it would be useful for it to make explicit what 
the uncertainty margins surrounding the headline figures are each time important steps in 
the SGP are taken. In some cases, it may make sense to postpone the abrogation of a 
procedure when the deficit ratio falls to below 3% of GDP, but remains so close to it that 
there is a significant risk that the deficit will have to be revised to above the reference 
value at a later stage, in particular if some other indicators suggest that an upward 
revision is likely. This proposal is consistent with the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, which puts the emphasis on durable consolidations.  
This paper has looked into deficit and debt figures compiled and reported by 14 Member 
States (i.e. excluding Greece and the new Member States) since 1994 for the period 1990 
to 2005. On the basis of the successive revisions in reported data, it assesses the 
reliability of budgetary statistics, derives a number of reliability indicators and infers the 
size of future data revisions. According to the standard deviations of revisions between 
the first outturn and final data, France, Germany and United Kingdom have reported the 
most reliable deficit/surplus figures. Denmark, Portugal, Luxembourg and Sweden are 
the countries that have had the largest dispersion of revisions. If one considers the 
average revisions, the two countries with largest deficit-increasing revisions have been 
Portugal and Italy.  
The paper has also shown that for several countries, notably Germany, Spain, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal, data on the yearly changes in debt have been more 
reliable than those on the deficit. For these countries, the yearly change in debt may be 
useful for counterchecking the plausibility of deficit figures and anticipating revisions in 
deficit figures. However, for several other countries, deficit figures have been more 
reliable than debt, or the difference is not significant. 
We have not identified any significant difference in the reliability of the first outturns of 
deficit data when compiled under the former ESA79 system and ESA95. However, 
ESA95 converge more quickly to final than data compiled prior to 2000 under ESA79. A 
conjecture according to which the shift from ESA79 to ESA95 would have led to a 
general deterioration in the reliability of data is not confirmed by the evidence. 
Our work has shown that the revisions of critical deficit figures – that is of deficit figures 
that are slightly below 3% of GDP – are smaller than the revisions when the government 
balance prior to the revisions is far from 3%. However, a more detailed analysis would 
be necessary before drawing conclusions on the causes of this result. 
Data revisions are inevitable; in a sense, they are even desirable. All countries should put 
particular emphasis on the improvement of their statistical system, to improve the 
reliability and other quality dimensions of their data. In particular, those countries that 
have registered the largest data revisions should carefully analyse their revisions on a 
regular basis and consider whether changes in the statistical processes are needed so that 
the reliability of the first release improves. 
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Although we studied more than 1200 revisions, the available samples per country are  
relatively small. As a result, our results should be considered with prudence. However, 
that should not preclude an awareness of the distinct variations in reliability in the data 
compiled and reported by different countries.  
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Annexes 
I- Data management 
I.1 Available sample  
The available sample consists of data reported to the Commission by Member States in 
the context of the excessive deficit procedure. Each data transmission (also called a 
vintage) covers the previous four years. The data transmissions also include forecasts for 
the current year, which are not taken into consideration in this paper. The sample 
contains data for 16 years: 1990 to 2005, reported between March 1994 and October 
2006. Until the end of 2005, data used to be reported by 1 March and 1 September each 
year. From the beginning of 2006, the reporting dates moved to 1 April and 1 October.31 
Therefore, deficit and debt figures of year t are reported for the first time in spring t+1, 
and then successively revised every 6 months until autumn t+4. 
Table I.1 shows the available sample for the United Kingdom; other Member States’ data 
have a similar shape. Note that the number of available ages is not the same for each 
year, since each year has not been subject to the same number of data transmissions. Data 
for years 1993 to 2002 were reported eight times, that is, from the first outcome until 
final data; for 2003 six times: the seventh transmission will take place in spring 2007 and 
the eighth in the autumn 2007; for 2004 there have been four transmissions to date, while 
data for 2005 have so far been transmitted only twice. Data for 1990 were subject to two 
transmissions only (they dropped out of the data transmission after being reporting twice, 
in spring and autumn 1994), data for 1991 were transmitted four times, and data for 1992 
six times. 
Table I.1: Example of basic data sample – deficit data reported by the United Kingdom  
Deficit (-) figures
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mar-94 -8300 -15900 -37800 -48300
Sep-94 -8165 -15127 -36601 -48664
Mar-95 -15127 -36601 -49365 -46063
Sep-95 -14995 -37575 -49093 -45586
Mar-96 -37575 -49093 -45382 -41742
Sep-96 -37540 -49310 -45380 -40358
Mar-97 -49310 -45380 -39052 -32311
Sep-97 -49660 -45532 -38854 -35971
Mar-98 -45613 -38592 -34805 -14377
Sep-98 -45613 -38592 -34805 -16142
Mar-99 -40032 -32970 -14823 5302
Sep-99 -40032 -32970 -15292 3940
Mar-00 ESA 95 starts -32909 -16294 2549 10728
Sep-00 -32909 -16294 3810 11835
Mar-01 -16294 3810 11420 41453
Sep-01 -16924 3810 11420 40439
Mar-02 3458 10333 39086 8803
Sep-02 1992 10322 37477 7622
Mar-03 10322 37477 7881 -14058
Sep-03 9092 36136 7154 -15401
Mar-04 36106 6987 -16277 -34945
Sep-04 36351 6716 -18074 -36049
Mar-05 6716 -18074 -36977 -36893
Sep-05 7234 -16658 -36640 -36139
Mar-06 -16817 -36715 -38660 -44727
Sep-06 -17039 -36257 -37641 -39732  
As the case of the UK in Table I.1 illustrates, each country sample contains 104 
observations. However, there are in fact 8 different sub-samples for each country 
corresponding to the 8 ages of data with 13 observations for every age.  
                                                 
31  In the paper, we disregard this change in the transmission deadlines and will simply refer to the spring 
and autumn data transmissions. 
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I.2 Levels and ratios 
Revisions in the deficit and debt ratios can occur because of revisions in the numerators 
(deficit/debt) and denominators (GDP). In this paper, however, we study only the 
revision in the numerators. We have disregarded the fact that the nominal GDP figures 
are also subject to revision and that such revisions have an impact on the deficit/debt 
ratios. This is for two reasons, both pragmatic. First, routine revisions in the GDP figures 
rarely have a significant impact on the deficit ratios. This can be illustrated with a simple 
numerical example. Assume a deficit of 3% of GDP; if the nominal GDP for a given year 
is revised upwards by 1% – which, for a routine revision, would be a very large, and 
extremely rare, revision – the deficit ratio would fall by 0.03% points only. Of course, 
there are also larger revisions in GDP of a structural nature. For example in autumn 
2005, the GDP levels of the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal were revised upwards by 
around 4%.32 However, by their very nature, structural revisions are not relevant to this 
analysis, as they do not help us infer the size of future revisions. 
A second reason for not considering revisions in the denominator is connected with the 
differences in the deficit and GDP compilation. The deficit is mainly compiled by an 
additive procedure. This means that the identification and correction of a routine error in 
the deficit for a given year t does not necessarily have any implications for the deficit of 
year t+1. The compilation of GDP is mainly a multiplicative process; the identification 
and correction of a routine error in the GDP level of a given year t usually leads to 
similar revisions for the subsequent years. As a result, the reliability of GDP levels is 
much more complex to measure, and analyses of GDP revisions often focus on the 
growth rates.33 
Although we are only interested in the revision in the numerators, there is a need to 
standardise the deficit/debt levels and the respective revisions across time and countries. 
Therefore, all calculations are as a percentage of GDP; to simplify, we use the GDP 
series available in the European Commission’s AMECO databank. 
I.3 Synthetic indicators of reliability  
For each data transmission, there are data of different ages and with different revision 
histories. In spring t, data for t-1 are transmitted for the first time, data for t-2 are 
transmitted for the third time, data for t-3 are transmitted for the fifth time and data for 
t-4 are transmitted for the seventh time. Each data transmission thus contains data of 
different ages: ages 1, 3, 5 and 7 in spring, and 2, 4, 6 and 8 in autumn. We aim at 
calculating reliability indicators for each age, that is, to estimate how these figures are 
susceptible of revision before reaching final status in age 8. Data of age 2 are expected to 
be more reliable than date of age 1, data of age 3 are expected to be more reliable than 
data of age 2, etc. Data of age 8 are final. 
For years that have been subject to eight transmissions, there are seven revisions between 
two consecutive vintages. These revisions can be treated as random variables. Therefore, 
there are seven variables for the deficit and debt figures of each country for which a 
small number (10 to 13) of observations are available. This is obviously a very small 
                                                 
32  We should also note a revision in the Greek GDP series by 26% as announced in September 2006. At 
the time of writing, the new series has not yet been validated by Eurostat (see Eurostat News Release 
N° 139/2006 of 23 October 2006). In any case, Greece is not systematically considered in this paper. 
33  On revisions in GDP figures see, Aruoba (2005) and Di Fonzo. (2005). 
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sample for inference purposes; a more appropriate sample which would allow better 
inference would need to contain around 30 revisions for each age of data. However, a 
sample of such size will only be available beyond 2020. 
Our aim is to infer the behaviour of these variables representing the revisions in order to 
calculate synthetic indicators of reliability. These variables, corresponding to the 
revisions of the different ages, can be cumulated to calculate total revisions from any 
given age to final data. It is possible to apply the central limit theorem and the law of 
large numbers (Lyapunov theorem) assuming that the general conditions of this theorem 
are complied and that the variables are normally distributed. Given the small size of the 
available sample by country, we were not able to perform the usual normality tests, such 
as the Lilliefors test. The Shapiro-Wilks test, which is appropriate for samples smaller 
than 50 observations, has been applied and it shows that for 28 variables of a total of 196 
(98 for deficit and 98 for debt) the null hypothesis of normal distribution is not rejected. 
The Lilliefors test shows that the complete sample (pooling data of the 14 countries) is 
normally distributed, a result which is a consequence of the law of large numbers. 
In order to set a procedure to calculate variances, and also as a previous condition of the 
Lyapunov theorem, it is crucial to test the independence of the variables. If variables are 
normally distributed and are independent, the characteristic function of the sum is the 
characteristic function of a variable normally distributed with a mean equal to the sum of 
the means and variance equal to the sum of variances. The Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient shows that 57% of the total variables on a country-by-country 
basis are independent; the Spearman rank correlation coefficient allows 86% of variables 
to be considered independent. Therefore, we have accepted the independence of the 
series.  
Furthermore, we have carried out equality tests for mean and variance on a basis of an 
ANOVA model with a single factor. The test shows that it is not possible to reject the 
equality of means of the revisions over the previous vintages, but allows us to clearly 
reject the null hypothesis for equality of variance across variables. 
To calculate the average revision and the standard deviation of these revisions for each 
age, one could simply compare the series of data for each age with final data. However, 
because of the small size of the samples, the heterogeneity of samples (for several years, 
we do not have data of all ages) and the structural breaks that need to be removed from 
the sample – namely the break because of the shift from ESA79 to ESA95 – another 
technique must be used. If we simply compared data of age 1 with data of age 8, we 
could only work with data for 1993 to 1995 and 1999 to 2002. The data transmissions for 
1990 to 1992 would be lost as the data of earlier ages are not available; data for 1996 to 
1998 would also be lost because there was a structural break (shift to ESA79 to ESA95) 
in the transmission of spring 2000; and finally data for 2003 to 2005 would also be lost 
as the final ages are still missing. 
We have circumventing the heterogeneity of the sample by calculating the averages and 
variances of revisions in data between each consecutive ages of data (data of age 1 are 
compared to data of age 2; data of age 2 are compared with data of age 3, and 
successively). The average revision from each age until age 8 is calculated by adding the 
successive average revisions together. Assuming that the variables are independent, as 
discussed above, that is, assuming that the revisions linked to an age are independent of 
revisions of other ages, the standard deviations are calculated by adding up the unbiased 
33 
estimators of variances of each variable, that is, of each age revision, and then calculating 
the square root.  
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II- Reliability indicators and structural revisions 
II.1. Denmark 
Denmark used to classify 2nd-pillar pension schemes in government. In September 2004, 
pursuant to the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004, Denmark reclassified these pension 
schemes in the financial sector; this led to a fall in the government surplus of around 1% 
of GDP and an increase in government debt. In March 2005, Denmark returned to the 
previous sectoral classification in line with a transitory period granted by Eurostat on 23 
September 2004. Denmark will once again have to change the sectoral classification of 
pensions schemes in spring 2007.34 
When calculating the reliability indicators for Denmark, the deficit and debt revisions of 
autumn 2004 and spring 2005 for each of the concerned years were put together and the 
total revision (the two revisions largely offset each other) was evenly distributed among 
the relevant data ages.  
II.2. Portugal and Sweden 
As discussed in section 5, the inference on future revisions is meaningful only if the 
sample contains only routine revisions and structural revisions have been removed. This 
was not systematically attempted in this paper, given the small size of the available 
sample – there is the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater – and the difficulty 
of identifying structural revisions. 
However, to illustrate the impact that structural revisions may have on data, Figure II.1 
shows fan charts (confidence level of 90%) for Portugal and Sweden, two of the 
countries most affected by structural breaks. The dotted lines are as in the main text of 
the paper – that is, the only structural break identified and removed corresponds to the 
shift from ESA79 to ESA95. The long dashed lines define the fan chart after removing a 
number of country-specific structural breaks. 
The structural breaks removed from the sample of Portugal are the 5th revision for 1999, 
the 3rd revision for 2000 and the 1st revision for 2001, which took place after the so-
called Constâncio-I report of summer 2002. Those deficit revisions concerned mainly the 
recording of capital injections and taxes. For Sweden, the revisions removed are the 6th 
revision for 2000, the 4th revision for 2001 and the 2nd revision for 2002 which 
concerned changes in the recording of taxes. 
Although the number of revisions removed from the Portuguese and Swedish samples is 
the same, the impact on the reliability indicators as summarised in the fan charts is quite 
different. For Portugal, the impact is negligible; for Sweden, the fan becomes much 
narrower. These two cases illustrate that quantitative indicators on the reliability of data 
must be interpreted carefully, in particular for countries that have undergone structural 
changes in the compilation of their data. 
 
                                                 
34  See Eurostat News Releases N°30/2004 of 2 March 2004 and N° 117/2004 of 23 September 2004. 
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Figure II.1: Effect of structural breaks for Portugal and Sweden on the confidence intervals for the 
deficit/surplus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The charts illustrate how the removal of structural revisions affects the reliability indicators for 
Portugal and Sweden. While for the former, the impact is negligible; the confidence interval becomes 
much narrower for Sweden. These two cases illustrate that prudence is needed when interpreting the 
reliability of data, in particular for countries that have undergone major changes in the compilation of their 
data. 
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III- Reliability indicators for debt 
The analysis for deficit figures shown in sections 4 and 5 can be replicated to debt 
figures. Tables III.1 and III.2 show Member States ranked according to the standard 
deviations of debt data revisions and the average revision, while table III.3 shows the 
average of debt data revisions in absolute value for all countries.35 
Information on the reliability of the debt can also be summarised in fan charts (Figure 
III.1), as we did for the deficit in section 5. The bands delimited by the dotted lines show 
the confidence intervals at a confidence level of 90% (or 95% for unilateral confidence 
levels).  
 
Table III.1: Member States ranked by the standard deviation of revisions in debt (% of GDP) 
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 DE(0.33%) DE(0.27%) DE(0.26%) NL(0.16%) NL(0.12%) NL(0.03%) SE(0.01%)
2 ES(0.53%) NL(0.38%) NL(0.31%) DE(0.17%) DE(0.17%) DE(0.12%) PT(0.01%)
3 UK(0.54%) FI(0.39%) FI(0.33%) FI(0.29%) FI(0.23%) FR(0.21%) NL(0.03%)
4 FI(0.56%) FR(0.41%) ES(0.38%) FR(0.30%) ES(0.23%) ES(0.22%) ES(0.05%)
5 NL(0.62%) ES(0.50%) FR(0.39%) ES(0.36%) IT(0.28%) FI(0.23%) FI(0.05%)
6 IT(0.68%) UK(0.53%) UK(0.41%) UK(0.40%) FR(0.28%) IT(0.26%) UK(0.07%)
7 FR(0.72%) SE(0.64%) IT(0.48%) IT(0.45%) UK(0.31%) UK(0.29%) IT(0.09%)
8 SE(0.79%) IT(0.65%) SE(0.62%) SE(0.60%) LU(0.58%) SE(0.45%) DE(0.12%)
9 IE(1.03%) IE(0.99%) LU(0.81%) LU(0.79%) SE(0.60%) LU(0.54%) FR(0.14%)
10 LU(1.06%) LU(1.00%) IE(0.95%) IE(0.88%) IE(0.85%) IE(0.64%) LU(0.16%)
11 DK(1.82%) DK(1.76%) AT(1.54%) DK(1.49%) AT(0.92%) AT(0.90%) AT(0.23%)
12 BE(1.96%) BE(1.78%) DK(1.65%) AT(1.52%) DK(1.20%) BE(1.10%) DK(0.59%)
13 AT(2.24%) AT(2.11%) BE(1.66%) BE(1.53%) BE(1.28%) DK(1.13%) IE(0.60%)
14 PT(2.42%) PT(2.41%) PT(1.96%) PT(1.95%) PT(1.39%) PT(1.39%) BE(0.71%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the standard deviations of revisions in debt figures between any given data 
transmission and final data. The first column corresponds to the revisions between the first outturn for year 
t reported in spring t+1 and final data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A higher value in 
standard deviation of the revisions means more dispersion in deficit data for the same period over different 
data transmissions and a worse position of the country in terms of reliability.  
 
                                                 
35  Greece has not been systematically considered in the tables and charts. The standard deviation of 
revisions in debt data in Greece from the 1st transmission to final data has been 5.78% of GDP and the 
average revision is +4.17% of GDP. 
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Table III.2: Member States ranked by the average of revisions in debt (% of GDP) 
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 PT(-1.22%) PT(-1.27%) PT(-0.78%) PT(-0.81%) PT(-0.39%) PT(-0.40%) FR(-0.06%)
2 SE(-0.24%) SE(-0.20%) SE(-0.24%) SE(-0.20%) SE(-0.22%) SE(-0.15%) LU(-0.04%)
3 BE(-0.23%) UK(-0.19%) UK(-0.12%) UK(-0.14%) UK(-0.07%) UK(-0.09%) NL(-0.02%)
4 UK(-0.17%) FI(-0.04%) BE(0.01%) BE(-0.08%) NL(0.02%) BE(-0.03%) FI(-0.02%)
5 FI(-0.16%) BE(-0.01%) FI(0.03%) NL(0.00%) FR(0.02%) NL(-0.01%) UK(-0.01%)
6 NL(0.04%) FR(0.07%) FR(0.04%) FI(0.04%) FI(0.04%) FR(0.02%) SE(0.00%)
7 DE(0.15%) NL(0.09%) NL(0.07%) DE(0.05%) DE(0.05%) DE(0.03%) PT(0.01%)
8 FR(0.24%) DE(0.13%) DE(0.11%) FR(0.08%) LU(0.10%) FI(0.06%) IT(0.02%)
9 LU(0.52%) LU(0.45%) LU(0.30%) LU(0.26%) BE(0.14%) ES(0.12%) ES(0.02%)
10 ES(0.57%) ES(0.47%) ES(0.37%) ES(0.28%) ES(0.15%) LU(0.13%) DE(0.03%)
11 IE(0.59%) IT(0.52%) IT(0.37%) IT(0.33%) IT(0.17%) IT(0.16%) AT(0.03%)
12 DK(0.67%) DK(0.54%) DK(0.50%) IE(0.46%) AT(0.33%) IE(0.24%) IE(0.15%)
13 IT(0.70%) IE(0.65%) IE(0.54%) DK(0.51%) IE(0.36%) DK(0.30%) DK(0.18%)
14 AT(1.20%) AT(1.19%) AT(0.72%) AT(0.71%) DK(0.44%) AT(0.33%) BE(0.19%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the average revisions in debt figures between any given data transmission and final 
data. The first column (revisions from age 1 to age 8) corresponds to the revisions between the first outturn 
for year t reported in spring t+1 and final data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A negative 
(positive) value means an expected increase (reduction) in the debt.  
 
Table III.3: Member States ranked by the average of revisions in debt in absolute values (% of 
GDP) 
1st 
transmission to 
final
2nd 
transmission to 
final
3rd 
transmission to 
final
4th 
transmission to 
final
5th 
transmission to 
final
6th 
transmission to 
final
7th 
transmission to 
final
1 DE(0.28%) DE(0.17%) DE(0.15%) DE(0.08%) DE(0.08%) NL(0.02%) SE(0.00%)
2 UK(0.54%) SE(0.44%) FI(0.29%) NL(0.16%) NL(0.10%) DE(0.04%) PT(0.01%)
3 SE(0.73%) FI(0.44%) UK(0.33%) FI(0.18%) FI(0.10%) FI(0.09%) FI(0.02%)
4 FI(0.74%) UK(0.45%) NL(0.35%) UK(0.27%) UK(0.18%) UK(0.13%) NL(0.02%)
5 ES(0.75%) NL(0.50%) SE(0.37%) SE(0.31%) ES(0.19%) ES(0.15%) ES(0.02%)
6 NL(0.86%) FR(0.55%) ES(0.45%) FR(0.33%) FR(0.26%) SE(0.15%) UK(0.04%)
7 FR(0.90%) ES(0.65%) FR(0.47%) ES(0.36%) SE(0.29%) FR(0.16%) DE(0.04%)
8 IT(1.05%) IT(0.88%) LU(0.61%) LU(0.50%) IT(0.30%) LU(0.23%) IT(0.05%)
9 LU(1.11%) LU(0.90%) IT(0.63%) IT(0.54%) LU(0.30%) IT(0.23%) LU(0.05%)
10 IE(1.49%) IE(1.31%) PT(1.00%) AT(0.90%) PT(0.44%) AT(0.40%) FR(0.08%)
11 PT(1.67%) PT(1.53%) AT(1.06%) PT(0.91%) AT(0.49%) PT(0.44%) AT(0.09%)
12 DK(1.93%) DK(1.59%) IE(1.15%) IE(0.92%) DK(0.70%) IE(0.47%) DK(0.18%)
13 AT(2.15%) AT(1.63%) DK(1.34%) DK(1.06%) IE(0.80%) DK(0.56%) BE(0.23%)
14 BE(2.41%) BE(1.84%) BE(1.49%) BE(1.23%) BE(0.82%) BE(0.60%) IE(0.36%)
Revisions cumulated from
 
Note: The table shows the average revisions in debt in absolute values between any given data 
transmission and final data. The first column corresponds to the absolute revisions between the first 
outturn for year t reported in spring t+1 and final data for the same year as transmitted in autumn t+4. A 
higher value in this indicator means less reliable figures.  
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Figure III.1: Fan charts illustrating the reliability of government debt figures. 
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Note: This series of charts show the latest available debt series (the thick line) and confidence intervals 
surrounding those figures. The intervals defined by the dotted lines correspond to bilateral confidence 
levels of 90%. The unilateral confidence levels are 95%. 
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